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            The pending case of Philippines v. China before the International Court 
of Arbitration concerns the two countries’ claims for territory and economic 
rights in the South China Sea, an area said to be the fiercest-contested in Asia. 
China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Taiwan, and Malaysia all have 
overlapping claims in it.1 The South China Sea is one of the world’s busiest 
maritime routes with more than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage 
and a third of all maritime traffic.2 It is also rich in fish stocks as well as oil and 
gas deposits. 3 The fight for control of the South China Sea is therefore the fight 
for power. For China, control of the waters could mean a Chinese regional 
hegemony,4 for others, e.g. Vietnam, it could mean resistance from such 
hegemony, which Vietnam sees as historically dangerous.5 
            In recent years, to cement its position and further its ambition, China has 
built seven artificial islets over uninhabited reefs and shoals as well as exerted 
significant military control over the area surrounding them.6 China also believes 
that it controls 80 or 90 percent of the 1.35 million square-mile sea that falls 
within the “nine-dashed line,” a feature drawn on Chinese maps by its Nationalist 
government in 1947.7 China is projected to outspend the United States in military 
and especially in the naval forces, “outbuilding the U.S. in new submarines by 
four to one.”8 If China prevails in this conflict, it would have even more 
influence on trade, and along the way, help advance its international prowess 
greatly into the 21st century.9 East Asia expert Robert Kaplan compares the 
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importance of the South China Sea to China to that of the Caribbean Sea to the 
U.S. where gaining complete naval dominance in the Caribbean Sea has given 
the U.S. hegemonic influence over the Caribbean states and a significant part of 
South America.10 Now, China wishes to do the same with East and Southeast 
Asia. 
            The U.S., China’s chief economic rival and as the world’s current sole 
super-power, also has interests in this case and the South China Sea at large. The 
reason for this is two-fold: first, the U.S. has an interest in protecting a “legal, 
rule-based order enshrining a freedom of navigation.”11 The second reason is 
strictly political: the U.S. does not trust China and is fearful of Chinese 
dominance in Asia,12 a region which, according to President Barack Obama, 
“represents the future.”13 It is the same reason the President has used to justify 
the creation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.14 However, while the U.S. is critical 
of China for not abiding by international law, and in this case, the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it has also been accused of 
hypocrisy and undue interference, among other things.15 In fact the U.S. has not 
yet ratified UNCLOS itself, despite Hillary Clinton and the Obama 
administration’s push for the Senate to do so.16 
            Although the Philippines do not contest with China as much maritime 
territory as Vietnam and Taiwan, it also seeks to prevent a “Chinese westward 
push at its expenses.17 It is unsurprising that as the weaker state in this conflict, it 
seeks adjudication in an international court. It also perceives very strongly, 
however, that UNCLOS grants it territory and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) 
vital to its economy, and the sea operates as national security, trade channels, 
fishing grounds, and especially the oil reserves within the perceived EEZ.18 The 
Philippines cannot get what it wants by competing arms with China, because it 
does not have the competitive resources to do so, not without help from the 
U.S.19 Therefore, diplomacy and international law have become the Philippines’ 
primary strategic focus.20  
            Hypothetically, the Philippines could have brought this case before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the most powerful international tribunal. 
However, for the ICJ to gain jurisdiction, the parties have to agree.21 It is unlikely 
China would subject itself to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, or any court’s jurisdiction, 
because its legal arguments are meritless. 
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            Given China’s utmost unwillingness for this matter to be adjudicated,22 
the only way for the Philippines, and potentially other rival claimants, to bring a 
court case is by utilizing the dispute settlement mechanism in UNCLOS.23 
Because both the Philippines and China are parties to the Convention (the 
Philippines ratified it on May 8, 1984 and China on June 7, 1996), they are both 
bound by the dispute settlement procedures provided for in Part XV of the 
Convention in respect of any dispute between them concerning the interpretation 
or application of the Convention.24  
THE PCA JURISDICTION AWARD 
            The Philippines, whose head counsel – Mr. Paul Reichler – is something 
of a legend. Mr. Reichler won the landmark case Nicaragua v. United States 
before the ICJ, and on January 22, 2015, he filed suit against China at the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).25 After hearings conducted from July 7, 
2015 to July 15, 2015, the PCA ruled on jurisdiction.26 The Tribunal for the PCA 
held that the case “was properly constituted” and that “the Philippines’ act of 
initiating this arbitration did not constitute an abuse of process.”27 The case was 
properly constituted because: first, any “dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application” of UNCLOS is to be resolved by a court which has jurisdiction,28 
and second, the PCA was a court explicitly listed in the Convention as having 
jurisdiction.29 
            China has repeatedly asserted its position that it will not participate in the 
proceedings, because the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over China’s “territorial 
sovereignty” in the South China Sea.30 This position is unreasonable and is 
widely unpopular.31 For example, in its efforts to sabotage the Philippines’ legal 
arguments, China argued that the PCA’s jurisdiction was exempted from the 
Convention, because the Philippines was committing an “abuse of process.”32 
China said that the Philippines abused the Arbitration mechanism under 
UNCLOS, because it unilaterally initiated the proceedings without first 
exhausting diplomatic channels.33 Essentially, China wanted the Philippines to 
continue using negotiations exclusively for this dispute. 
            However, the Tribunal rejected China’s arguments. The Tribunal 
acknowledged the Philippines had sought to negotiate with China, but said that 
international law does not require a State to continue negotiations “when it 
concludes that the possibility of a negotiated solution has been exhausted.”34 
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Although Article 283 of UNCLOS mandates the two parties in a dispute to go 
through an “exchange of views” before going to the court,35 the Tribunal found 
ample evidence that the Philippines and China have “exchanged views” but could 
not, and would likely not, come up with a mutually satisfactory results.36  
            The Tribunal, after rigorously examining all other possible recourses 
under international law which China claims the Philippines had not 
“exhausted”—the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
(DOC), the Treaty of Amity, the Convention for Biological Diversity, and other 
bilateral treaties between China and the Philippines—concluded none would 
preclude the Philippines’ right to compulsory dispute settlement under 
UNCLOS.37 The Tribunal noted the dispute settlement provisions in UNCLOS 
was heavily negotiated and reflects a compromise, and parties cannot “pick and 
choose” after the fact which provisions apply.38 This note implicitly accused 
China of violating pacta sunt servanda. 39      
            According to the Tribunal, however, the jurisdictional issue is not fully 
resolved on all of the Philippines’ requests. The PCA has requested the 
Philippines clarify a submission and will consider seven specific submissions “in 
conjunction with the merits.”40 
THE APPLICATION OF UNCLOS 
            Since the case began, the Philippines had presented its position on fifteen 
items relating to the hotly contested and resource-rich waters west of the 
Philippines. The Tribunal decided it was the proper body to decide on seven of 
the Philippines’ submissions, while seven others are reserved for further 
consideration because those issues “do not possess an exclusively preliminary 
character.”41 The Philippines was also directed to “clarify the content and narrow 
the scope” of its 15th submission which states that “China shall desist from 
further unlawful claims and activities.”42 The Tribunal made it clear that the other 
fourteen claims, however, will proceed to the merits phase, even if the PCA’s 
jurisdiction over seven of those claims is to be decided in conjunction with the 
merits.43              
            Because the pending decision will likely address the merits of all those 
claims, it is proper to discuss all of them. There are substantive similarities 
between the claims, and the fifteen claims depend on four primary inquiries: (1) 
the status of Beijing’s “nine-dash line” sovereignty assertion; (2) the legality of 
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China’s occupation of various features in the South China Sea; (3) the legality of 
China’s exploiting natural resources in what the Philippines perceives as its EEZ; 
and (4) the legality of China’s interference with the Philippines’ navigation 
within its EEZ.    
            First is the status of Beijing’s nine-dash line claim in the South China 
Sea. The Philippines argues the nine-dash line is an excessive maritime claim and 
not in line with the entitlements for coastal states under UNCLOS.44 China has 
kept the scope of its nine-dash line “rights formed in history” but giving no 
elaboration on the legal nature and effect of such rights.45 In China’s view, if it 
indeed possesses such rights to certain land features in the South China Sea, its 
territorial seas, EEZs, and rights to various maritime features would be 
expanded.46 
47 
            Based on the record so far, however, it is likely China’s “historic” nine-
dash line will be held invalid. The sole “historic” evidence that China has 
presented so far is not entirely convincing: it is a map drawn by what was known 
as the Republic of China (ROC), before it gained independence and became 
Taiwan today.48 There are two problems with this evidence: first, the legitimacy 
of the drawn map and “historic rights” associated with it are deeply in question,49 
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and second, even if the map is legitimate, who would be the rightful holder of 
such “historic rights” to the sea – China or Taiwan?    
            The second, third, and fourth primary inquiries in this case will be heavily 
dependent upon resolution of the first, whether the nine-dash line is an excessive 
claim. If it is, the Philippines argues, China’s occupation of various features in 
the Spratly, exploitation of natural resources in the Philippines’ EEZ, and 
interference with travel in the Philippines’ EEZ are all illegal because such 
activities are well beyond China’s territorial seas or EEZs.  
            If “historic rights” do not apply, then UNCLOS favors the Philippines’ 
positions in these three issues because first, under UNCLOS, any rights to water 
generally attach to territorial ownership of certain land features,50 and second, the 
features China is currently occupying and exercising control over will not qualify 
as such rights-giving land features. To illustrate, the Convention lists three 
different types of features, each giving surrounding waters certain, distinctive 
legal effects: 
(1) Islands 
            The first is “island” defined as “a naturally formed area of land, 
surrounded by water and above water at high tide.”51 An island, such as the 
entirety of Cuba or of Singapore, entitles the country that owns it to a 12 nautical 
mile (approx. 14 miles) territorial sea from the coastline with which it has full 
sovereignty.52 A country can exclude foreign entities from its territorial sea.53 
            The island is also entitled to a 200 nm (approximately 370 km) EEZ 
which gives the country the sole right to exploit the resources within it such as 
fish, minerals, and oil reserves, if any.54 Articles 60(8) and 80 of UNCLOS 
further prescribe that an artificial island constructed in the EEZ or on the 
continental shelf “does not possess the status of [an] island.”55 As compared to 
the islands specified in Articles 10(2) and 121(2), which could be used as a base 
point to measure sea zones, artificial islands within the context of Article 60(8) 
“have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the 
delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental 
shelf.” 
(2) Rocks or Reefs 
            The second features are “rocks or reefs” that are mostly below water but 
have rocky protrusions above water during high tide.56 The important point under 
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UNCLOS states that a maritime feature is a rock if “it cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life on its own.”57 These mostly submerged features are 
entitled to only a 12 nm territorial sea and no EEZ.58  
(3) Low-tide Elevations 
            The third type of maritime features called “low-tide elevations” are 
submerged rocks and reefs that are not visible above water.59 This type of 
maritime feature is not entitled to any territorial sea or EEZ.60 
            If the features China control at best only amount to “rocks or reefs” then 
the territorial issue concerning the “nine-dash line” does not need to be 
considered. Unfortunately for China, this seems to be the case. There are eight 
maritime features of concern that are currently under the control of China.61 The 
first four are low-tide elevations that are completely submerged: Mischief Reef, 
Kennan Reef, Gaven Reef, and Subi Reef.62 “These are all below water at high 
tide. They’re not entitled to anything. No territorial sea, no EEZ. But all of these 
four are physically occupied by China.”63 China has constructed concrete 
structures on the reefs including helicopter landing pads over the years since 
1995 but that does not give them entitlements to the seas around it because they 
would still not be considered “islands” in UNCLOS terms.64       
            The other four are rocks or reefs that are, at most, entitled to only 12 nm. 
These are Scarborough shoal, Johnson reef, Cuarteron reef, and Fiery Cross reef. 
These are rocks or reefs at best, because they fail the critical inquiry: they cannot 
sustain economic life on their own.65 Despite Chinese efforts building artificially 
islets to add to the land mass in these shoal and reefs,66 there is no economic life 
on those rocks and the only life there is military.67  
            Because of such circumstances, UNCLOS dictates that “China’s EEZ 
extending southward from its coastline gets it comparatively little beyond deep 
blue water, with exceptions including Pratas Island, Macclesfield Bank, and 
Scarborough Shoal” while “everyone else’s EEZs get them possession of shallow 
archipelagic areas near coasts thought to contain energy deposits.”68 The 





            “Maritime features,” which include islands, rocks and reefs, and low-tide 
elevations possess complex physical geographic characteristics and a multiplicity 
of legal statuses, according to which they generate different maritime rights. 
Maritime delimitation therefore creates different legal effects. Although South 
China Sea expert Wu Shicun opines that such complexities are incapable of being 
regulated only by the Convention, and international judicial practice has yet to 
evolve a standard capable of rendering objective judicial determination of the 
legal rights and wrongs in such disputed waters,70 what we know for certain is 
that any determination on the legal status of maritime features immediately alters 
a country’s territorial sovereignty.71 The world is waiting for the PCA decision, 
and China will have to respond.  
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            According to the Philippines College of Law Professor Jay L. 
Batongbacal, the jurisdictional decision already stands to benefit China’s rival 
Asian states, regardless of the case’s final outcome.72 China’s “nine-dash line” 
claim may now be legally discussed, explained, and evaluated by the Tribunal 
based on the cumulative statements and explanations of Chinese officials and 
academics even if this is done without their direct participation.73 Internationally, 
Professor Batongbacal says, this could seriously undermine China’s influence 
over South China Sea stakeholders and domestically it could challenge the 
credibility of Chinese leadership.74 
            In the political angle, it will be difficult to reach resolution to this dispute 
purely through negotiation channels such as the DOC, as China insists. 
Therefore, adjudication is necessary. Negotiations have been and likely will 
remain difficult because China has always had unfair realpolitik advantage and 
all parties to this dispute are “guilty of playing domestic politics with their 
claims.”75 In Vietnam, for example, nationalistic sentiment is strong.76 Aristotle 
has taught that “law is intellect without appetite,”77 and since the mass population 
has “appetite,” peace may be easier to achieve if they are left out of the equation, 
at least in some degree. In the meantime, it is necessary for the U.S. to maintain 
its naval check on China in the region.78 
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